Add a state field for the v7M PRIGROUP register and implent
reading and writing it. The current NVIC doesn't honour
the values written, but the new version will.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Rename the nvic_state struct to NVICState, to match
our naming conventions.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
The i.MX timer device can be reset by writing to the SWR bit
of the CR register. This has to behave differently from hard
(power-on) reset because it does not reset all of the bits
in the CR register.
We were incorrectly implementing soft reset and hard reset
the same way, and in addition had a logic error which meant
that we were clearing the bits that soft-reset is supposed
to preserve and not touching the bits that soft-reset clears.
This was not correct behaviour for either kind of reset.
Separate out the soft reset and hard reset code paths, and
correct the handling of reset of the CR register so that it
is correct in both cases.
Signed-off-by: Kurban Mallachiev <mallachiev@ispras.ru>
[PMM: rephrased commit message, spacing on operators;
use bool rather than int for is_soft_reset]
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
In 2.9 ITS will block save/restore and migration use cases. As such,
let's introduce a user option that allows to turn its instantiation
off, along with GICv3. With the "its" option turned false, migration
will be possible, obviously at the expense of MSI support (with GICv3).
Signed-off-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1487681108-14452-1-git-send-email-eric.auger@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
object_new(FOO) returns an object with ref_cnt == 1
and following
object_property_set_bool(cpuobj, true, "realized", NULL)
set parent of cpuobj to '/machine/unattached' which makes
ref_cnt == 2.
Since machvirt_init() doesn't take ownership of cpuobj
returned by object_new() it should explicitly drop
reference to cpuobj when dangling pointer is about to
go out of scope like it's done pc_new_cpu() to avoid
object leak.
Signed-off-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1487253461-269218-1-git-send-email-imammedo@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
In SDHCI protocol, the 'Block count enable' bit of the Transfer
Mode register is relevant only in multi block transfers. We need
not check it in single block transfers.
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Message-id: 20170214185225.7994-5-ppandit@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
In sdhci_write invoke multi block transfer if it is enabled
in the transfer mode register 's->trnmod'.
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Message-id: 20170214185225.7994-4-ppandit@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
In the SDHCI protocol, the transfer mode register value
is used during multi block transfer to check if block count
register is enabled and should be updated. Transfer mode
register could be set such that, block count register would
not be updated, thus leading to an infinite loop. Add check
to avoid it.
Reported-by: Wjjzhang <wjjzhang@tencent.com>
Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Message-id: 20170214185225.7994-3-ppandit@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
In SDHCI protocol, the transfer mode register is defined
to be of 6 bits. Mask its value with '0x0037' so that an
invalid value could not be assigned.
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>
Message-id: 20170214185225.7994-2-ppandit@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Switch to using qcrypto_random_bytes() rather than rand() as
our source of randomness for the BCM2835 RNG.
If qcrypto_random_bytes() fails, we don't want to return the guest a
non-random value in case they're really using it for cryptographic
purposes, so the best we can do is a fatal error. This shouldn't
happen unless something's broken, though.
In theory we could implement this device's full FIFO and interrupt
semantics and then just stop filling the FIFO. That's a lot of work,
though, and doesn't really give a very nice diagnostic to the user
since the guest will just seem to hang.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Recent vanilla Raspberry Pi kernels started to make use of
the hardware random number generator in BCM2835 SoC. As a
result, those kernels wouldn't work anymore under QEMU
but rather just freeze during the boot process.
This patch implements a trivial BCM2835 compatible RNG,
and adds it as a peripheral to BCM2835 platform, which
allows to boot a vanilla Raspberry Pi kernel under Qemu.
Changes since v1:
* Prevented guest from writing [31..20] bits in rng_status
* Removed redundant minimum_version_id_old
* Added field entries for the state
* Changed realize function to reset
Signed-off-by: Marcin Chojnacki <marcinch7@gmail.com>
Message-id: 20170210210857.47893-1-marcinch7@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Commit a3a3d8c7 introduced a segfault bug while checking for
'dc->vmsd->unmigratable' which caused QEMU to crash when trying to add
devices which do no set their 'dc->vmsd' yet while initialization.
Place a 'dc->vmsd' check prior to it so that we do not segfault for
such devices.
NOTE: This doesn't compromise the functioning of --only-migratable
option as all the unmigratable devices do set their 'dc->vmsd'.
Introduce a new function check_migratable() and move the
only_migratable check inside it, also use stubs to avoid user-mode qemu
build failures.
Signed-off-by: Ashijeet Acharya <ashijeetacharya@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <1487009088-23891-1-git-send-email-ashijeetacharya@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Load the network boot image into guest RAM when the boot
device selected is a network device. Use some of the reserved
space in IplBlockCcw to store the start address of the netboot
image.
A user could also use 'chreipl'(diag 308/5) to change the boot device.
So every time we update the IPLB, we need to verify if the selected
boot device is a network device so we can appropriately load the
network boot image.
Signed-off-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Add new field to S390IPLState to store the name of the network boot
loader.
Signed-off-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
The current QEMU ROM infrastructure rejects late loading of ROMs.
And ELFs are currently loaded as ROM, this prevents delayed loading
of ELFs. So when loading ELF, allow the user to specify if ELF should
be loaded as ROM or not.
If an ELF is not loaded as ROM, then they are not restored on a
guest reboot/reset and so its upto the user to handle the reloading.
Signed-off-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Now that the all callbacks have been converted to use "at" syscalls, we
can drop this code.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_open2() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) open() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
(4) local_post_create_passthrough() which calls in turn lchown() and
chmod(), both functions also following symbolic links
This patch converts local_open2() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
mkdirat() to fix (1), as well as local_set_xattrat(),
local_set_mapped_file_attrat() and local_set_cred_passthrough() to
fix (2), (3) and (4) respectively. Since local_open2() already opens
a descriptor to the target file, local_set_cred_passthrough() is
modified to reuse it instead of opening a new one.
The mapped and mapped-file security modes are supposed to be identical,
except for the place where credentials and file modes are stored. While
here, we also make that explicit by sharing the call to openat().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_mkdir() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) mkdir() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
(4) local_post_create_passthrough() which calls in turn lchown() and
chmod(), both functions also following symbolic links
This patch converts local_mkdir() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
mkdirat() to fix (1), as well as local_set_xattrat(),
local_set_mapped_file_attrat() and local_set_cred_passthrough() to
fix (2), (3) and (4) respectively.
The mapped and mapped-file security modes are supposed to be identical,
except for the place where credentials and file modes are stored. While
here, we also make that explicit by sharing the call to mkdirat().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_mknod() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) mknod() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
(4) local_post_create_passthrough() which calls in turn lchown() and
chmod(), both functions also following symbolic links
This patch converts local_mknod() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
mknodat() to fix (1), as well as local_set_xattrat() and
local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (2) and (3) respectively.
A new local_set_cred_passthrough() helper based on fchownat() and
fchmodat_nofollow() is introduced as a replacement to
local_post_create_passthrough() to fix (4).
The mapped and mapped-file security modes are supposed to be identical,
except for the place where credentials and file modes are stored. While
here, we also make that explicit by sharing the call to mknodat().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_symlink() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) symlink() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) open(O_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic links for all path elements but
the rightmost one
(3) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(4) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
This patch converts local_symlink() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
symlinkat() to fix (1), openat(O_NOFOLLOW) to fix (2), as well as
local_set_xattrat() and local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (3) and
(4) respectively.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_chown() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) lchown() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
This patch converts local_chown() to rely on open_nofollow() and
fchownat() to fix (1), as well as local_set_xattrat() and
local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (2) and (3) respectively.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_chmod() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) chmod() which follows symbolic links for all path elements
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
We would need fchmodat() to implement AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW to fix (1). This
isn't the case on linux unfortunately: the kernel doesn't even have a flags
argument to the syscall :-\ It is impossible to fix it in userspace in
a race-free manner. This patch hence converts local_chmod() to rely on
open_nofollow() and fchmod(). This fixes the vulnerability but introduces
a limitation: the target file must readable and/or writable for the call
to openat() to succeed.
It introduces a local_set_xattrat() replacement to local_set_xattr()
based on fsetxattrat() to fix (2), and a local_set_mapped_file_attrat()
replacement to local_set_mapped_file_attr() based on local_fopenat()
and mkdirat() to fix (3). No effort is made to factor out code because
both local_set_xattr() and local_set_mapped_file_attr() will be dropped
when all users have been converted to use the "at" versions.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_link() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it calls:
(1) link() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) local_create_mapped_attr_dir()->mkdir() which follows symbolic links
for all path elements but the rightmost one
This patch converts local_link() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and linkat()
to fix (1), mkdirat() to fix (2).
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
When using the mapped-file security model, we also have to create a link
for the metadata file if it exists. In case of failure, we should rollback.
That's what this patch does.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_rename() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
uses rename() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one.
This patch simply transforms local_rename() into a wrapper around
local_renameat() which is symlink-attack safe.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_renameat() callback is currently a wrapper around local_rename()
which is vulnerable to symlink attacks.
This patch rewrites local_renameat() to have its own implementation, based
on local_opendir_nofollow() and renameat().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_lstat() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) lstat() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) getxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements
(3) local_mapped_file_attr()->local_fopen()->openat(O_NOFOLLOW) which
follows symbolic links in all path elements but the rightmost
one
This patch converts local_lstat() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
fstatat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) to fix (1), fgetxattrat_nofollow() to
fix (2).
A new local_fopenat() helper is introduced as a replacement to
local_fopen() to fix (3). No effort is made to factor out code
because local_fopen() will be dropped when all users have been
converted to call local_fopenat().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_readlink() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) open(O_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic links for all path elements but
the rightmost one
(2) readlink() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
This patch converts local_readlink() to rely on open_nofollow() to fix (1)
and opendir_nofollow(), readlinkat() to fix (2).
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_truncate() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls truncate() which follows symbolic links in all path elements.
This patch converts local_truncate() to rely on open_nofollow() and
ftruncate() instead.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_statfs() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls statfs() which follows symbolic links in all path elements.
This patch converts local_statfs() to rely on open_nofollow() and fstatfs()
instead.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_utimensat() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls qemu_utimens()->utimensat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic
links in all path elements but the rightmost one or qemu_utimens()->utimes()
which follows symbolic links for all path elements.
This patch converts local_utimensat() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
utimensat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) directly instead of using qemu_utimens().
It is hence assumed that the OS supports utimensat(), i.e. has glibc 2.6
or higher and linux 2.6.22 or higher, which seems reasonable nowadays.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_remove() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) lstat() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) remove() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one
This patch converts local_remove() to rely on opendir_nofollow(),
fstatat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) to fix (1) and unlinkat() to fix (2).
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_unlinkat() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls remove() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one.
This patch converts local_unlinkat() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
unlinkat() instead.
Most of the code is moved to a separate local_unlinkat_common() helper
which will be reused in a subsequent patch to fix the same issue in
local_remove().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_lremovexattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls lremovexattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements
but the rightmost one.
This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing fremovexattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to lremovexattr().
local_lremovexattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_lsetxattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls lsetxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but
the rightmost one.
This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing fsetxattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to lsetxattr().
local_lsetxattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_llistxattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls llistxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but
the rightmost one.
This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing flistxattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to llistxattr().
local_llistxattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_lgetxattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls lgetxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but
the rightmost one.
This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing fgetxattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to lgetxattr().
local_lgetxattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_open() and local_opendir() callbacks are vulnerable to symlink
attacks because they call:
(1) open(O_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic links in all path elements but
the rightmost one
(2) opendir() which follows symbolic links in all path elements
This patch converts both callbacks to use new helpers based on
openat_nofollow() to only open files and directories if they are
below the virtfs shared folder
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
This patch opens the shared folder and caches the file descriptor, so that
it can be used to do symlink-safe path walk.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the
guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system.
Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to
occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path
pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol
though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue
various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links.
In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none"
security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary
locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file"
security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some
help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host,
i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example.
The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system
calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component.
A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a
symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder.
This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively
opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor
pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a
file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory.
This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk
for any access to the backend.
Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could
change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable
effects:
- a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block
- a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal
These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY.
Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one
to open the rightmost path element.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(),
assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//',
fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
If these functions fail, they should not change *fs. Let's use local
variables to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
These functions are always called indirectly. It really doesn't make sense
for them to sit in a header file.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
This patchset adds the throttle support for the 9p-local driver.
For now this functionality can be enabled only through qemu cli options.
QMP interface and support to other drivers need further extensions.
To make it simple for other 9p drivers, the throttle code has been put in
separate files.
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Jagadeesh <pradeep.jagadeesh@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alberto Garcia <berto@igalia.com>
(pass extra NULL CoMutex * argument to qemu_co_queue_wait(),
added options to qemu-options.hx, Greg Kurz)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
In this case, we are marshaling an error status instead of the errno value.
Reorganize the out and out_nofid labels to look like all the other cases.
Coverity reports this because the "err = -ENOENT" and "err = -EINVAL"
assignments above are dead, overwritten by the call to pdu_marshal.
(Coverity issues CID1348512 and CID1348513)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(also open-coded the success path since locking is a nop for us, Greg Kurz)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Don't truncate the multiplication and do a 64 bit one instead
because the result is stored in a 64 bit variable.
This fixes a similar coverity warning to commits 237a8650d6 and
4382fa6554, in a similar way, and is the final third of the fix for
coverity CID 1167561 (hopefully!).
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Acked-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
The register_read() and register_write() functions expect a bitmask argument.
To avoid duplicated code, a new inlined function register_enabled_mask() is
introduced.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
The "qemu,register" device needs to be wired up in source code, there
is no way the user can make any real use of this device with the
"-device" parameter or the "device_add" monitor command yet.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
