qemu/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 433442a75d system: Move 'exec/confidential-guest-support.h' to system/
"exec/confidential-guest-support.h" is specific to system
emulation, so move it under the system/ namespace.
Mechanical change doing:

  $ sed -i \
    -e 's,exec/confidential-guest-support.h,sysemu/confidential-guest-support.h,' \
        $(git grep -l exec/confidential-guest-support.h)

Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20241218155913.72288-2-philmd@linaro.org>
2024-12-20 17:44:56 +01:00

99 lines
3.2 KiB
C

/*
* QEMU Confidential Guest support
* This interface describes the common pieces between various
* schemes for protecting guest memory or other state against a
* compromised hypervisor. This includes memory encryption (AMD's
* SEV and Intel's MKTME) or special protection modes (PEF on POWER,
* or PV on s390x).
*
* Copyright Red Hat.
*
* Authors:
* David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
*
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
* later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*
*/
#ifndef QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
#define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
#error Cannot include system/confidential-guest-support.h from user emulation
#endif
#include "qom/object.h"
#define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support"
OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass,
CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
Object parent;
/*
* True if the machine should use guest_memfd for RAM.
*/
bool require_guest_memfd;
/*
* ready: flag set by CGS initialization code once it's ready to
* start executing instructions in a potentially-secure
* guest
*
* The definition here is a bit fuzzy, because this is essentially
* part of a self-sanity-check, rather than a strict mechanism.
*
* It's not feasible to have a single point in the common machine
* init path to configure confidential guest support, because
* different mechanisms have different interdependencies requiring
* initialization in different places, often in arch or machine
* type specific code. It's also usually not possible to check
* for invalid configurations until that initialization code.
* That means it would be very easy to have a bug allowing CGS
* init to be bypassed entirely in certain configurations.
*
* Silently ignoring a requested security feature would be bad, so
* to avoid that we check late in init that this 'ready' flag is
* set if CGS was requested. If the CGS init hasn't happened, and
* so 'ready' is not set, we'll abort.
*/
bool ready;
};
typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
ObjectClass parent;
int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
int (*kvm_reset)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass;
static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
Error **errp)
{
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass;
klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs);
if (klass->kvm_init) {
return klass->kvm_init(cgs, errp);
}
return 0;
}
static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_reset(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
Error **errp)
{
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass;
klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs);
if (klass->kvm_reset) {
return klass->kvm_reset(cgs, errp);
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H */