9pfs: local: lremovexattr: don't follow symlinks

The local_lremovexattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls lremovexattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements
but the rightmost one.

This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing fremovexattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to lremovexattr().

local_lremovexattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().

This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Greg Kurz 2017-02-26 23:42:51 +01:00
parent 3e36aba757
commit 72f0d0bf51
4 changed files with 36 additions and 20 deletions

View file

@ -234,17 +234,43 @@ int pt_setxattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path, const char *name, void *value,
return local_setxattr_nofollow(ctx, path, name, value, size, flags);
}
int pt_removexattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path, const char *name)
static ssize_t fremovexattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *filename,
const char *name)
{
char *buffer;
char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d/%s", dirfd, filename);
int ret;
buffer = rpath(ctx, path);
ret = lremovexattr(path, name);
g_free(buffer);
ret = lremovexattr(proc_path, name);
g_free(proc_path);
return ret;
}
ssize_t local_removexattr_nofollow(FsContext *ctx, const char *path,
const char *name)
{
char *dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(path);
char *filename = g_path_get_basename(path);
int dirfd;
ssize_t ret = -1;
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
goto out;
}
ret = fremovexattrat_nofollow(dirfd, filename, name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
out:
g_free(dirpath);
g_free(filename);
return ret;
}
int pt_removexattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path, const char *name)
{
return local_removexattr_nofollow(ctx, path, name);
}
ssize_t notsup_getxattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{